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Delegation of the scholars needs courage and assurance for an EnlightenedHeart to Distinguish Right from Wrong

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Delegation of the scholars needs courage and assurance for an EnlightenedHeart to Distinguish Right from Wrong:

We said there are limits to underestimate the exaggeration in the words of some. For instance, Sayyed Khomeinisays, “Every one of the scholars has the right of leadership on the matters of Muslims. This starts with the treasury and continues to establishing punishments. Not only that, but also he has the right to control the souls of the Muslims if the governance requires disposition thereof. They have the authority, as regards the aspects of government, as much as the Prophet (P) and the Imams (P) had.”([1])

In my opinion, this broad range of leadership reaching disposition of the souls entails a risk. Government work sets its foundation on doubted interests. Actually, there is no knowledge of actual realities. There is no evidence that the doubted interests that anyone other than the infallible reaches is a sufficient rationale for the disposition of souls, honors, or money just because government work requires so without being under the category of what is a lawfully (Sharia) known judgment. Does the scholar-leader have the right to order the slaughter of offerings on behalf of pilgrims in their countries to benefit from their meat instead of wasting millions of offerings in Mena for an underlying benefit? Can he order the killing of someone or divorce of a woman, as there is an underlying and required benefit to do so? The proponents of the broad leadership feature the idea that he may divorce the wife of anyone and take the money of another without him being asked about the underlying justification, as he is the authority over such matters, as will be indicated, hopefully.

Claiming such a level of delegation forscholars would require courage and assurance to enlighten the heart to distinguish the right against the wrong in order to see the truth in each decision, situation and action. Allah says, {O you who have believed! if you fear Allah, He will grant you a criterion}(Anfal:29). He says, “[He] rather [rules] on the souls of Muslims if the government requires disposition thereof.” This is evident for the infallibles although it never happened in any incident. They had no disposition of souls, honor, or money according to their leadership at all even without the apparent application of any of the titles of any of the laws(sharia) implemented. The prophet (P) ordered cutting of Samra’s palm tree as it had become a prospective damage. He forbad feudalism of land and monopoly of water to ensure justice. Imam Al-Hadi (P) ordered the killing of Fares Ibn Hatem as he was inciting sedition and a heretic([2]). There was never a case like the killing of a boy by the pious hermit. That was absolutely a rule of Allah that caused Prophet Moses (P) to object to it. Indeed, there are similar cases like the order of the Prophet (P) to kill Thi al-Thadya Harkous Ibn Zuhair as he was going to convert from the religion and lead the Kharijites; however, the killing did not happen. There was the order of Imam Sadek (P) for Abu Haroun the blind to enter the furnace, but he did not burn and fire was cool without harm.

In order to be fair, we found in the words of Sayyed Khomeini indications that he does not abide by such broadness of the leadership of the scholar. Such authorities are out of their domain, as the evidence on the leadership of the scholar does not imply including them. He said, “What has been proven to [be within the authority of] the Prophet (P) and Imams in terms of leadership and rule is evident for the scholar. However, what was proven to be part of their competence in other aspects is not proven.

One proposition says that the infallible Imam has the right of rule over the divorce of a person’s wife. He (P) can sell the man’s belongings or takea part of it, even if the public interest does not stipulate such actions. However, there is no evidence for the scholar, and there is no indicationthat the evidence presented affirms such an order for the narration do decisively enable a deduction that would be specific in this regard.”([3])

In my opinion, the dispute with him [Khomeini] is that he sees that the scholar-leader has the right to independently examine the conclusion regarding public interest. He considers that it is sufficient for him to take something into consideration to implement leadership and take the suitable action. We do not say it is sufficient as the knowledge of the scholar does not include realinterests. It would only be possible if they were in one of the laws we would mention, which are actually really broad. It is possible to discover that some titles apply and that there is benefit. This includes, for example, there is a difference between paving a road and have people’s homes torn and land expropriated as necessarily required for an interest seen by the government. In another case, they might do so to prevent damage and hardship from people if we do not implement this project. The scholar might take a decision to ban pilgrimage to Meccatemporarily. It might be in one case to achieve a certain political interest. In another, it might be to prevent the pilgrims from a security threat or a lethal epidemic, and the like. The second example is valid but not the first based on what we have mentioned.

Scholars, even if they were deputies of the Imams (P), in the leadership of the nation’s matters, and even if they had delegated them their authorities, this does not include everything. One scholar cannot say that interest dictates such and such if there were no lawful (Sharia) principle that applies to this. Additionally, this would be contradictory to the firmly believed lawful provisions.([4])



([1]) Book of Sale (Kitab al- Bay’): 2/625; researching the Islamic Government and the Leadership of the Scholar.

([2]) Refer to the narration in Wasail Shia: Book of Jihad; Chapter on Jihad against the Enemy. Chapter: 47, Section 1.

([3]) Book of Sale: 2/654.

([4]) There are narrations that discuss suspending the order to pay Khums until further notice. An alternative would be changing the amount to one-half of the sixth to take into consideration the situations of Shia. This was mentioned in the narration of Ali Ibn Mehzeyar (Wasail Shia: Book of Khums; Chapters on When Khums should be paid, Chapter 8, Section: 4). Another example is changing the type of expiation according to the circumstances. There was a narration citing Abi Abdullah (P), “Talking about a man who needs to sacrifice a cow, if the man cannot find [afford] it, then he can sacrifice seven sheep.” Hadith (Wasail Shia: 14/ 201, Chapters of sacrifice, Chapter: 56, Section 1). If we suppose this is a procedural order for a cause that lies abroad and nota process of information for a sharia ruling as an alternative, then there is a stipulated public interest. The infallible can here legislate alternatives or dispose of the initial ruling. However, the scholar-leader does not consider it as a part of his authorities to conduct such actions without a sharia evidence. He cannot prevent pilgrims from slaughtering offerings in Mena and bind them to slaughter in their countries to benefit from hundreds of thousands of cattle heads, which is a sure benefit.

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