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On the Scholar’s Leadership not being Inclusive of the Evidence of the Initial Provisions

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On the Scholar’s Leadership not being Inclusive of the Evidence of the Initial Provisions:


To sum up the advanced points, a scholar’s leadership is not an independent title to initiate provisions in accordance with interests. It would entail initial titles such as the government of the title of fearing (Taqiyah), damage, and distress, as was reported on Sayyed Khomeini([1]), and his student Sheikh Montazari. It is rather an implementation of the initial and secondary provisions and working within their framework from which their authorities are taken.

If you said, the performance of the sharia provisions and complying with the secondary titles are part of the authorities of all those practicing Muslims. Consequently, it is not restricted to the scholar, such as fearing (Taqiyah), damage, distress, and necessity and the like, how is the scholar different from others, then.

I would respond, there are many differences:

1-  When a practicing Muslim abides by the secondary titles, it would be in personal matters. As for public matters such as the damage to public interest, definitely not everyone would be able to diagnose this damage or take an action to rectify it. However,people might take the scholar-leader’s permission[regarding any matter]; otherwise,chaos would definitely be the norm.


The accomplishment of secondary titles in public cases in what is not easily known to individuals for not knowing the various interferences and for jostling among them can be determined by the scholar-leader.

 

 

 

 



([1]) Sayyed Kazem Ha’iri cites in his book (Religious Chiefdom and Leadership: 165) the saying of Sayyed Khomeini, “The rule of the leadership is prior even to the initial ruling.” He says in the explanation, “The rule of the scholar-leader is not restricted to the secondary rulings and what is allowed. It further extends and gains priority over obligatory initial provisions.” This would be like ordering the violation of the sharia rule or suspending work with the legal duty. He tried to answer about the problem of ordering the sale of a house without the consent of the owner and stopping Hajj even when it is possible to. His answer was not clear, but he explained the saying of Sayyed Khomeini in accordance with the limits that we have mentioned. He said (P:168), “He [Sayyed Khomeini] does not mean the scholar has the right, for example, to say that prayer, fasting, or Hajj are not orders. He, however, has the right to diagnose the priorities among the initial rules as regards the social issues when they occur. Then, he has the right to diagnose the priorities and set the ranks of priority, promoting one over the other”. This is against what he first mentioned as the disposition was under the secondary title where the jostling occurs. It would be part of the limits mentioned for the authorities of the scholar-leader. We leave the details for an independent deliberation on the leadership of the scholar, hopefully.